ISAP v2.0

Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Stefan Mangard, Florian Mendel, Bart Mennink, Robert Primas, Thomas Unterluggauer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We specify Isap v2.0, a lightweight permutation-based authenticated encryption algorithm that is designed to ease protection against side-channel and fault attacks. This design is an improved version of the previously published Isap v1.0, and offers increased protection against implementation attacks as well as more efficient implementations. Isap v2.0 is a candidate in NIST’s LightWeight Cryptography (LWC) project, which aims to identify and standardize authenticated ciphers that are well-suited for applications in constrained environments. We provide a self-contained specification of the new Isap v2.0 mode and discuss its design rationale. We formally prove the security of the Isap v2.0 mode in the leakage-resilient setting. Finally, in an extensive implementation overview, we show that Isap v2.0 can be implemented securely with very low area requirements.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)390-416
Number of pages27
JournalIACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
Volume2020
Issue numberSpecial Issue 1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2020

Keywords

  • Authenticated encryption
  • Leakage resilience
  • NIST LWC
  • Sponges

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computational Mathematics
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Computer Science Applications

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