In this paper, we propose SassCache, a secure skewed associative cache with keyed index mapping. For this purpose, we design a new two-layered, low-latency cryptographic construction with configurable output coverage based on state-of-the-art cryptographic primitives. Based on this construction, SassCache is the first secure randomized cache with secure spacing. Victim cache lines automatically hide in locations the attacker cannot reach after less than 1 access on average. Consequently, attackers cannot evict the cache line, no matter which and how many memory accesses they perform. Our security analysis shows that all existing techniques for eviction set construction fail, and state-of-the-art attacks only apply to 1 in 3 million addresses, where SassCache is still as secure as ScatterCache. Compared to standard caches, SassCache has a single-threaded performance penalty of 1.75 % on the last-level cache hit rate in the SPEC2017 benchmark, and an average decrease of 11.7 p.p. in hit rate for MiBench, GAP and Scimark for our high-security settings.
|Titel||44th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2023)|
|Publikationsstatus||Angenommen/In Druck - 10 Nov. 2022|
|Veranstaltung||44th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy: S&P 2023 - San Francisco, USA / Vereinigte Staaten|
Dauer: 22 Mai 2023 → 25 Mai 2023
|Kurs||44th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy|
|Land/Gebiet||USA / Vereinigte Staaten|
|Zeitraum||22/05/23 → 25/05/23|