Projekte pro Jahr
Abstract
Modern operating system kernels employ address space layout randomization (ASLR) to prevent control-flow hijacking attacks and code-injection attacks.
While kernel security relies fundamentally on preventing access to address information, recent attacks have shown that the hardware directly leaks this information.
Strictly splitting kernel space and user space has recently been proposed as a theoretical concept to close these side channels. However, this is not trivially possible due to architectural restrictions of the x86 platform.
In this paper we present KAISER, a system that overcomes limitations of x86 and provides practical kernel address isolation.
We implemented our proof-of-concept on top of the Linux kernel, closing all hardware side channels on kernel address information.
KAISER enforces a strict kernel and user space isolation such that the hardware does not hold any information about kernel addresses while running in user mode.
We show that KAISER protects against double page fault attacks, prefetch side-channel attacks, and TSX-based side-channel attacks.
Finally, we demonstrate that KAISER has a runtime overhead of only 0.28%.
While kernel security relies fundamentally on preventing access to address information, recent attacks have shown that the hardware directly leaks this information.
Strictly splitting kernel space and user space has recently been proposed as a theoretical concept to close these side channels. However, this is not trivially possible due to architectural restrictions of the x86 platform.
In this paper we present KAISER, a system that overcomes limitations of x86 and provides practical kernel address isolation.
We implemented our proof-of-concept on top of the Linux kernel, closing all hardware side channels on kernel address information.
KAISER enforces a strict kernel and user space isolation such that the hardware does not hold any information about kernel addresses while running in user mode.
We show that KAISER protects against double page fault attacks, prefetch side-channel attacks, and TSX-based side-channel attacks.
Finally, we demonstrate that KAISER has a runtime overhead of only 0.28%.
Originalsprache | englisch |
---|---|
Titel | Engineering Secure Software and Systems - 9th International Symposium, ESSoS 2017, Proceedings |
Herausgeber (Verlag) | Springer-Verlag Italia |
Seiten | 161-176 |
Seitenumfang | 16 |
Band | 10379 LNCS |
ISBN (Print) | 9783319621043 |
DOIs | |
Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2017 |
Veranstaltung | 9th International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems, ESSoS 2017 - Bonn, Deutschland Dauer: 3 Juli 2017 → 5 Juli 2017 |
Publikationsreihe
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
---|---|
Band | 10379 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (elektronisch) | 1611-3349 |
Konferenz
Konferenz | 9th International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems, ESSoS 2017 |
---|---|
Land/Gebiet | Deutschland |
Ort | Bonn |
Zeitraum | 3/07/17 → 5/07/17 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Theoretische Informatik
- Informatik (insg.)
Fingerprint
Untersuchen Sie die Forschungsthemen von „KASLR is Dead: Long Live KASLR“. Zusammen bilden sie einen einzigartigen Fingerprint.Projekte
- 2 Abgeschlossen
-
EU - SOPHIA - Absicherung von Software gegen Physische Angriffe
1/09/16 → 31/08/21
Projekt: Forschungsprojekt
-
Verlaesslichkeit im Internet der Dinge
Boano, C. A., Kubin, G., Bloem, R., Horn, M., Pernkopf, F., Zakany, N., Mangard, S., Witrisal, K., Römer, K. U., Aichernig, B., Bösch, W., Baunach, M. C., Tappler, M., Malenko, M., Weiser, S., Eichlseder, M., Leitinger, E., Grosinger, J., Großwindhager, B., Ebrahimi, M., Alothman Alterkawi, A. B., Knoll, C., Teschl, R., Saukh, O., Rath, M., Steinberger, M., Steinbauer-Wagner, G. & Tranninger, M.
1/01/16 → 31/03/22
Projekt: Forschungsprojekt