KASLR is Dead: Long Live KASLR

Daniel Gruss*, Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Richard Fellner, Clémentine Maurice, Stefan Mangard

*Korrespondierende/r Autor/-in für diese Arbeit

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandBeitrag in einem KonferenzbandBegutachtung

Abstract

Modern operating system kernels employ address space layout randomization (ASLR) to prevent control-flow hijacking attacks and code-injection attacks.
While kernel security relies fundamentally on preventing access to address information, recent attacks have shown that the hardware directly leaks this information.
Strictly splitting kernel space and user space has recently been proposed as a theoretical concept to close these side channels. However, this is not trivially possible due to architectural restrictions of the x86 platform.

In this paper we present KAISER, a system that overcomes limitations of x86 and provides practical kernel address isolation.
We implemented our proof-of-concept on top of the Linux kernel, closing all hardware side channels on kernel address information.
KAISER enforces a strict kernel and user space isolation such that the hardware does not hold any information about kernel addresses while running in user mode.
We show that KAISER protects against double page fault attacks, prefetch side-channel attacks, and TSX-based side-channel attacks.
Finally, we demonstrate that KAISER has a runtime overhead of only 0.28%.
Originalspracheenglisch
TitelEngineering Secure Software and Systems - 9th International Symposium, ESSoS 2017, Proceedings
Herausgeber (Verlag)Springer-Verlag Italia
Seiten161-176
Seitenumfang16
Band10379 LNCS
ISBN (Print)9783319621043
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2017
Veranstaltung9th International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems, ESSoS 2017 - Bonn, Deutschland
Dauer: 3 Juli 20175 Juli 2017

Publikationsreihe

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Band10379 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (elektronisch)1611-3349

Konferenz

Konferenz9th International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems, ESSoS 2017
Land/GebietDeutschland
OrtBonn
Zeitraum3/07/175/07/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretische Informatik
  • Informatik (insg.)

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