Related-Key Forgeries for Proest-OTR

Christoph Erwin Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder*, Florian Mendel

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference paperpeer-review

Abstract

We present a forgery attack on Prøst-OTR in a related-key setting. Prøst is a family of authenticated encryption algorithms proposed as candidates in the currently ongoing CAESAR competition, and Prøst-OTR is one of the three variants of the Prøst design. The attack exploits how the Prøst permutation is used in an Even-Mansour construc-
tion in the Feistel-based OTR mode of operation. Given the ciphertext and tag for any two messages under two related keys K and K ⊕ ∆ with related nonces, we can forge the ciphertext and tag for a modified
message under K. If we can query ciphertexts for chosen messages under K ⊕ ∆, we can achieve almost universal forgery for K. The computational complexity is negligible.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFast Software Encryption - FSE 2015
Place of PublicationCham
PublisherSpringer
Pages282-296
ISBN (Print)978-3-662-48115-8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Event2015 Fast Software Encryption Workshop: FSE 2015 - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: 9 Mar 201511 Mar 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science(
PublisherSpringer
Volume9054

Conference

Conference2015 Fast Software Encryption Workshop
Abbreviated titleFSE 2015
Country/TerritoryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period9/03/1511/03/15

Fields of Expertise

  • Information, Communication & Computing

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Related-Key Forgeries for Proest-OTR'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this