Related-Key Impossible-Differential Attack on Reduced-Round SKINNY

Ralph Ankele, Subhadeep Banik, Avik Chakraborti, Eik List, Florian Mendel, Siang Meng Sim, Gaoli Wang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference paperpeer-review

Abstract

At CRYPTO’16, Beierle et al. presented SKINNY, a family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers intended to compete with the NSA designs SIMON and SPECK. SKINNY can be implemented efficiently in both soft- and hardware and supports block sizes of 64 and 128 bits as well as tweakey sizes of 64, 128, 192 and 128, 256, 384 bits respectively. This paper presents a related-tweakey impossible-differential attack on up to 23 (out of 36) rounds of SKINNY-64/128 for different tweak sizes. All our attacks can be trivially extended to SKINNY-128/128.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationApplied Cryptography and Network Security
Place of PublicationCham
Pages208-228
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-61204-1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017
Event15th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security: ACNS 2017 - Kanazawa, Japan
Duration: 10 Jul 201712 Jul 2017
Conference number: 15

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume10355

Conference

Conference15th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Abbreviated titleACNS
Country/TerritoryJapan
CityKanazawa
Period10/07/1712/07/17

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