At Eurocrypt 2017 the first secret-key distinguisher for 5-round AES has been presented. Although it allows to distinguish a random permutation from an AES-like one, it seems (rather) hard to exploit such a distinguisher in order to implement a key-recovery attack different than brute-force like. On the other hand, such result has been exploited to set up a new (competitive) secret-key distinguisher for 4-round AES, called “Mixture Differential Cryptanalysis”. In this paper, we combine this new 4-round distinguisher with a modified version of a truncated differential distinguisher in order to set up a new 5-round distinguisher, that exploits properties which are independent of the secret key, of the details of the S-Box and of the MixColumns matrix. As a result, while a “classical” truncated differential distinguisher exploits the probability that a pair of (two) texts satisfies or not a given differential trail independently of the others pairs, our distinguisher works with sets of (related) pairs of texts. In particular, our new 5-round AES distinguisher exploits the fact that such sets of texts satisfy some properties with a different probability than for a random permutation. Even if such 5-round distinguisher has a higher complexity than e.g. the “multiple-of-8” one present in the literature, it can be used as starting point to set up the first key-recovery attack on 6-round AES that exploits directly a 5-round secret-key distinguisher. The goal of this paper is indeed to present and explore new approaches, showing that even a distinguisher like the one presented at Eurocrypt – believed to be hard to exploit – can be the starting point for new secret-key distinguishers and/or key-recovery attacks.