Practical Keystroke Timing Attacks in Sandboxed JavaScript

Moritz Lipp, Daniel Gruss, Michael Schwarz, David Bidner, Clémentine Maurice, Stefan Mangard

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Keystrokes trigger interrupts which can be detected through software side channels to reconstruct keystroke timings. Keystroke timing attacks use these side channels to infer typed words, passphrases, or create user fingerprints. While keystroke timing attacks are considered harmful, they typically require native code execution to exploit the side channels and, thus, may not be practical in many scenarios. In this paper, we present the first generic keystroke timing attack in sandboxed JavaScript, targeting arbitrary other tabs, processes and programs. This violates same-origin policy, HTTPS security model, and process isolation. Our attack is based on the interrupt-timing side channel which has previously only been exploited using native code. In contrast to previous attacks, we do not require the victim to run a malicious binary or interact with the malicious website. Instead, our attack runs in a background tab, possibly in a minimized browser window, displaying a malicious online advertisement. We show that we can observe the exact inter-keystroke timings for a user’s PIN or password, infer URLs entered by the user, and distinguish different users time-sharing a computer. Our attack works on personal computers, laptops and smartphones, with different operating systems and browsers. As a solution against all known JavaScript timing attacks, we propose a fine-grained permission model.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationComputer Security – ESORICS 2017 - 22nd European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer-Verlag Italia
Pages191-209
Number of pages19
Volume10493 LNCS
ISBN (Print)9783319663982
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017
Event22nd European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2017 - Oslo, Norway
Duration: 11 Sep 201715 Sep 2017

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10493 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference22nd European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, ESORICS 2017
CountryNorway
CityOslo
Period11/09/1715/09/17

Keywords

  • Fingerprint
  • Interrupt
  • JavaScript
  • Keystroke
  • Side channel

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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  • Cite this

    Lipp, M., Gruss, D., Schwarz, M., Bidner, D., Maurice, C., & Mangard, S. (2017). Practical Keystroke Timing Attacks in Sandboxed JavaScript. In Computer Security – ESORICS 2017 - 22nd European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Proceedings (Vol. 10493 LNCS, pp. 191-209). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 10493 LNCS). Springer-Verlag Italia. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66399-9_11