On the Applicability of Time-Driven Cache Attacks on Mobile Devices

Raphael Spreitzer, Thomas Plos

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference paperpeer-review


Cache attacks are known to be sophisticated attacks against cryptographic implementations on desktop computers. Recently, investigations of such attacks on specific testbeds with processors that are employed in mobile devices have been done. In this work we investigate the applicability of Bernstein's timing attack and the cache-collision attack by Bogdanov et al. in real environments on three state-of-the-art mobile devices: an Acer Iconia A510, a Google Nexus S, and a Samsung Galaxy SIII. We show that T-table based implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) leak enough timing information on these devices in order to recover parts of the used secret key using Bernstein's timing attack. We also show that systems with a cache-line size larger than 32 bytes exacerbate the cache-collision attack of Bogdanov et al.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationNetwork and System Security - NSS 2013, 7th International Conference, Madrid, Spain, June 3-4, 2013, Proceedings
Publication statusPublished - 2013
EventInternational Conference on Network and System Security - Madrid, Spain
Duration: 3 Jun 20134 Jun 2013

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science


ConferenceInternational Conference on Network and System Security

Fields of Expertise

  • Information, Communication & Computing

Treatment code (Nähere Zuordnung)

  • Application


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