How trusted execution environments fuel research on microarchitectural attacks

Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) enabled research in scenarios where highest-privileged attackers had precise control over systems and microarchitecture. Insights gained from such attacks facilitated the discovery of non-TEE attacks, such as Spectre (as well as Foreshadow from within virtual machines).

Original languageEnglish
Article number9107096
Pages (from-to)18-27
Number of pages10
JournalIEEE Security and Privacy
Volume18
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Law

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