Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD

Maria Eichlseder; Daniel Kales; Markus Schofnegger

doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35199-1_10

Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD

Maria Eichlseder, Daniel Kales, Markus Schofnegger

Institute of Applied Information Processing and Communications (7050)

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference paper › peer-review

Abstract

FlexAEAD is one of the round-1 candidates in the ongoing NIST Lightweight Cryptography standardization project. In this note, we show several forgery attacks on FlexAEAD with complexity less than the security bound given by the designers, such as a block reordering attack on full FlexAEAD-128 with estimated success probability about 2^54. Additionally, we show some trivial forgeries and point out domain separation issues.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Cryptography and Coding - IMACC 2019
Publisher	Springer, Cham
Pages	200-214
Number of pages	15
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35199-1_10
Publication status	Published - Nov 2019
Event	IMACC 2019: 17th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding - Oxford, United Kingdom Duration: 16 Dec 2019 → 18 Dec 2019

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume	11929

Conference

Conference	IMACC 2019
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	Oxford
Period	16/12/19 → 18/12/19

Keywords

authenticated encryption
forgery attack
NIST LWC

Access to Document

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35199-1_10

https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/679Licence: CC BY 4.0

Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD
Maria Eichlseder (Speaker)
18 Dec 2019
Activity: Talk or presentation › Talk at conference or symposium › Science to science

Cite this

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title = "Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD",

abstract = "FlexAEAD is one of the round-1 candidates in the ongoing NIST Lightweight Cryptography standardization project. In this note, we show several forgery attacks on FlexAEAD with complexity less than the security bound given by the designers, such as a block reordering attack on full FlexAEAD-128 with estimated success probability about 2^54. Additionally, we show some trivial forgeries and point out domain separation issues.",

keywords = "authenticated encryption, forgery attack, NIST LWC",

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AB - FlexAEAD is one of the round-1 candidates in the ongoing NIST Lightweight Cryptography standardization project. In this note, we show several forgery attacks on FlexAEAD with complexity less than the security bound given by the designers, such as a block reordering attack on full FlexAEAD-128 with estimated success probability about 2^54. Additionally, we show some trivial forgeries and point out domain separation issues.

KW - authenticated encryption

KW - forgery attack

KW - NIST LWC

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35199-1_10

DO - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35199-1_10

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BT - Cryptography and Coding - IMACC 2019

PB - Springer, Cham

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Y2 - 16 December 2019 through 18 December 2019

ER -

Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Keywords

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Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD

Cite this