Fault Attacks on Nonce-based Authenticated Encryption: Application to Keyak and Ketje

Christoph Erwin Dobraunig, Stefan Mangard, Florian Mendel, Robert Primas

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionResearchpeer-review

Abstract

In the context of fault attacks on nonce-based authenticated encryption, an attacker faces two restrictions. The first is the uniqueness of the nonce for each new encryption that prevents the attacker from collecting pairs of correct and faulty outputs to perform, e.g., differential fault attacks. The second restriction concerns the verification/decryption, which releases only verified plaintext. While many recent works either exploit misuse scenarios (e.g. nonce-reuse, release of unverified plaintext), we turn the fact that the decryption/verification gives us information on the effect of a fault (whether a fault changed a value or not) against it. In particular, we extend the idea of statistical ineffective fault attacks (SIFA) to target the initialization performed in nonce-based authenticated encryption schemes. By targeting the initialization performed during decryption/verification, most nonce-based authenticated encryption schemes provide the attacker with an oracle whether a fault was ineffective or not. This information is all the attacker needs to mount statistical ineffective fault attacks. To demonstrate the practical threat of the attack, we target software implementations of the authenticated encryption schemes Keyak and Ketje. The presented fault attacks can be carried out without the need of sophisticated equipment. In our practical evaluation the inputs corresponding to 24 ineffective fault inductions were required to reveal large parts of the secret key in both scenarios.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSelected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2018
EditorsCarlos Cid, Michael J. Jacobson
PublisherSpringer
Pages257-277
Number of pages21
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-10970-7
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-10969-1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019
EventThe 33rd ACM/SIGAPP Symposium On Applied Computing - Pau, France
Duration: 9 Apr 201813 Apr 2018
https://www.sigapp.org/sac/sac2018/

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume11349

Conference

ConferenceThe 33rd ACM/SIGAPP Symposium On Applied Computing
Abbreviated titleACM SAC 2018
CountryFrance
CityPau
Period9/04/1813/04/18
Internet address

Fingerprint

Authenticated Encryption
Fault Attacks
Cryptography
Fault
Initialization
Restriction
Scenarios
Target
Encryption
Reuse
Proof by induction
Uniqueness
Attack
Side channel attack
Software
Output
Evaluation
Demonstrate

Keywords

  • Fault Attack
  • Statistical Ineffective Fault Attack
  • SIFA
  • Authenticated Encryption
  • Keyak
  • Ketje
  • Statistical ineffective fault attack
  • Authenticated encryption
  • Fault attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Dobraunig, C. E., Mangard, S., Mendel, F., & Primas, R. (2019). Fault Attacks on Nonce-based Authenticated Encryption: Application to Keyak and Ketje. In C. Cid, & M. J. Jacobson (Eds.), Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2018 (pp. 257-277). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 11349). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10970-7_12

Fault Attacks on Nonce-based Authenticated Encryption: Application to Keyak and Ketje. / Dobraunig, Christoph Erwin; Mangard, Stefan; Mendel, Florian; Primas, Robert.

Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2018. ed. / Carlos Cid; Michael J. Jacobson. Springer, 2019. p. 257-277 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 11349).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionResearchpeer-review

Dobraunig, CE, Mangard, S, Mendel, F & Primas, R 2019, Fault Attacks on Nonce-based Authenticated Encryption: Application to Keyak and Ketje. in C Cid & MJ Jacobson (eds), Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 11349, Springer, pp. 257-277, The 33rd ACM/SIGAPP Symposium On Applied Computing, Pau, France, 9/04/18. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10970-7_12
Dobraunig CE, Mangard S, Mendel F, Primas R. Fault Attacks on Nonce-based Authenticated Encryption: Application to Keyak and Ketje. In Cid C, Jacobson MJ, editors, Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2018. Springer. 2019. p. 257-277. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10970-7_12
Dobraunig, Christoph Erwin ; Mangard, Stefan ; Mendel, Florian ; Primas, Robert. / Fault Attacks on Nonce-based Authenticated Encryption: Application to Keyak and Ketje. Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2018. editor / Carlos Cid ; Michael J. Jacobson. Springer, 2019. pp. 257-277 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).
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