Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption

Thomas Unterluggauer, Stefan Mangard

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Memory and disk encryption is a common measure to protect sensitive information in memory from adversaries with physical access. However, physical access also comes with the risk of physical attacks. As these may pose a threat to memory confidentiality, this paper investigates contemporary memory and disk encryption schemes and their implementations with respect to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). It shows that DPA and DFA recover the keys of all the investigated schemes, including the tweakable block ciphers XEX and XTS. This paper also verifies the feasibility of such attacks in practice. Using the EM side channel, a DPA on the disk encryption employed
within the ext4 file system is shown to reveal the used master key on a Zynq Z-7010 system on chip. The results suggest that memory and disk encryption secure against physical attackers is at least four times more expensive.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationConstructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016
PublisherSpringer International Publishing AG
Pages3-18
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016
EventInternational Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - Graz, Austria
Duration: 14 Apr 201615 Apr 2016

Publication series

NameLNCS
Volume9689

Conference

ConferenceInternational Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
CountryAustria
CityGraz
Period14/04/1615/04/16

Fingerprint

Cryptography
Data storage equipment
Side channel attack

Keywords

  • memory encryption
  • side-channel attacks
  • DPA
  • fault analysis
  • DFA
  • power analysis
  • ext4

Fields of Expertise

  • Information, Communication & Computing

Cite this

Unterluggauer, T., & Mangard, S. (2016). Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption. In Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016 (pp. 3-18). (LNCS; Vol. 9689). Springer International Publishing AG . https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_1

Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption. / Unterluggauer, Thomas; Mangard, Stefan.

Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016. Springer International Publishing AG , 2016. p. 3-18 (LNCS; Vol. 9689).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionResearchpeer-review

Unterluggauer, T & Mangard, S 2016, Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption. in Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016. LNCS, vol. 9689, Springer International Publishing AG , pp. 3-18, International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, Graz, Austria, 14/04/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_1
Unterluggauer T, Mangard S. Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption. In Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016. Springer International Publishing AG . 2016. p. 3-18. (LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_1
Unterluggauer, Thomas ; Mangard, Stefan. / Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption. Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016. Springer International Publishing AG , 2016. pp. 3-18 (LNCS).
@inproceedings{9519fe42aa8d4ba9877976bd51cd0c40,
title = "Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption",
abstract = "Memory and disk encryption is a common measure to protect sensitive information in memory from adversaries with physical access. However, physical access also comes with the risk of physical attacks. As these may pose a threat to memory confidentiality, this paper investigates contemporary memory and disk encryption schemes and their implementations with respect to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). It shows that DPA and DFA recover the keys of all the investigated schemes, including the tweakable block ciphers XEX and XTS. This paper also verifies the feasibility of such attacks in practice. Using the EM side channel, a DPA on the disk encryption employed within the ext4 file system is shown to reveal the used master key on a Zynq Z-7010 system on chip. The results suggest that memory and disk encryption secure against physical attackers is at least four times more expensive.",
keywords = "memory encryption, side-channel attacks, DPA, fault analysis, DFA, power analysis, ext4",
author = "Thomas Unterluggauer and Stefan Mangard",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_1",
language = "English",
series = "LNCS",
publisher = "Springer International Publishing AG",
pages = "3--18",
booktitle = "Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016",
address = "Switzerland",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption

AU - Unterluggauer, Thomas

AU - Mangard, Stefan

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - Memory and disk encryption is a common measure to protect sensitive information in memory from adversaries with physical access. However, physical access also comes with the risk of physical attacks. As these may pose a threat to memory confidentiality, this paper investigates contemporary memory and disk encryption schemes and their implementations with respect to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). It shows that DPA and DFA recover the keys of all the investigated schemes, including the tweakable block ciphers XEX and XTS. This paper also verifies the feasibility of such attacks in practice. Using the EM side channel, a DPA on the disk encryption employed within the ext4 file system is shown to reveal the used master key on a Zynq Z-7010 system on chip. The results suggest that memory and disk encryption secure against physical attackers is at least four times more expensive.

AB - Memory and disk encryption is a common measure to protect sensitive information in memory from adversaries with physical access. However, physical access also comes with the risk of physical attacks. As these may pose a threat to memory confidentiality, this paper investigates contemporary memory and disk encryption schemes and their implementations with respect to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). It shows that DPA and DFA recover the keys of all the investigated schemes, including the tweakable block ciphers XEX and XTS. This paper also verifies the feasibility of such attacks in practice. Using the EM side channel, a DPA on the disk encryption employed within the ext4 file system is shown to reveal the used master key on a Zynq Z-7010 system on chip. The results suggest that memory and disk encryption secure against physical attackers is at least four times more expensive.

KW - memory encryption

KW - side-channel attacks

KW - DPA

KW - fault analysis

KW - DFA

KW - power analysis

KW - ext4

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_1

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_1

M3 - Conference contribution

T3 - LNCS

SP - 3

EP - 18

BT - Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016

PB - Springer International Publishing AG

ER -