Evolution of Defenses against Transient-Execution Attacks

Claudio Alberto Canella, Sai Manoj Pudukotai Dinakarrao, Daniel Gruß, Khaled N. Khasawneh

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Transient-execution attacks, such as Meltdown and Spectre, exploit performance optimizations in modern CPUs to enable unauthorized access to data across protection boundaries. Against these attacks, we have noticed a rapid growth of deployed and proposed countermeasures. In this paper, we show the evolution of countermeasures
against transient-execution attacks by both industry and academia since the initial discoveries of the attacks. We show that despite the advances in the understanding and systematic view of the field, the proposed and deployed defenses are limited.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGLSVLSI 2020 - Proceedings of the 30th Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2020
PublisherACM/IEEE
Number of pages6
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 7 Sep 2020
EventGLSVLSI 2020: 30th ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI - Virtuell, China
Duration: 8 Sep 202011 Sep 2020

Conference

ConferenceGLSVLSI 2020
CountryChina
CityVirtuell
Period8/09/2011/09/20

Keywords

  • Transient-execution attacks
  • Meltdown
  • Spectre
  • LVI

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    Cite this

    Canella, C. A., Pudukotai Dinakarrao, S. M., Gruß, D., & Khasawneh, K. N. (Accepted/In press). Evolution of Defenses against Transient-Execution Attacks. In GLSVLSI 2020 - Proceedings of the 30th Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2020 ACM/IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1145/3386263.3407584