Cryptanalysis of Ascon

Christoph Erwin Dobraunig*, Maria Eichlseder, Florian Mendel, Martin Schläffer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference paperpeer-review

Abstract

We present a detailed security analysis of the CAESAR candidate Ascon. Amongst others, cube-like, differential and linear cryptanalysis are used to evaluate the security of Ascon. Our results are practical key-recovery attacks on round-reduced versions of Ascon-128, where the initialization is reduced to 5 out of 12 rounds. Theoretical key-recovery attacks are possible for up to 6 rounds of initialization. Moreover, we present a practical forgery attack for 3 rounds of the finalization, a theoretical forgery attack for 4 rounds finalization and zero-sum distinguishers for the full 12-round Ascon permutation. Besides, we present the first results regarding linear cryptanalysis of Ascon, improve upon the results of the designers regarding differential cryptanalysis, and prove bounds on the minimum number of (linearly and differentially) active S-boxes for the Ascon permutation.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTopics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2015
Place of PublicationCham
PublisherSpringer
Pages371-387
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-16714-5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015
EventCryptographers´ Track at the RSA Conference - San Francisco, United States
Duration: 20 Apr 201524 Apr 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer
Volume9048

Conference

ConferenceCryptographers´ Track at the RSA Conference
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Francisco
Period20/04/1524/04/15

Fields of Expertise

  • Information, Communication & Computing

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