Separation of identity and location is one of the key properties of peer-to-peer networks. However, this separation can be abused to mount attacks against the network itself. Our contribution in this matter is twofold: First, we present a security-first design for P2P networking based on self-certifying identifiers. It provides message authenticity, integrity of routing tables, and authenticated communication, is resistant (and not only resilient) against many typical peer-to-peer-specific attacks, and guarantees uniform identifier distribution. The second aspect of our contribution disproves the often-quoted assumption that proof-of-work-based identifier generation can sufficiently hinder certain peer-to-peer attacks such as the Sybil attack. This finding seriously questions previously roposed proof-of-work-based defence mechanisms and leads to the only conclusion possible: Proof-of-work-based measures to limit arbitrary identifier generation do not stand the test of reality.
|Title of host publication||Security and Privacy in Communication Networks|
|Editors||Raheem Beyah, Bing Chang, Yingjiu Li, Sencun Zhu|
|Place of Publication||Cham|
|Number of pages||16|
|Publication status||Published - 2018|
|Event||14th EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks - , Singapore|
Duration: 8 Aug 2018 → 10 Aug 2018
|Name||Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering|
|Conference||14th EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks|
|Abbreviated title||SecureComm 2018|
|Period||8/08/18 → 10/08/18|
Prünster, B., Kollmann, C. P., Suzic, B., & Ziegler, D. (2018). A Holistic Approach Towards Peer-to-Peer Security and Why Proof of Work Won’t Do. In R. Beyah, B. Chang, Y. Li, & S. Zhu (Eds.), Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (pp. 122-138). ( Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering ; Vol. 255). Cham: Springer International.