EU - SCARD - Side Channel Analysis Resistant Design Flow

  • Mangard, Stefan (Co-Investigator (CoI))
  • Herbst, Christoph, (Co-Investigator (CoI))
  • Wolkerstorfer, Johannes, (Co-Investigator (CoI))
  • Oswald, Maria Elisabeth, (Co-Investigator (CoI))
  • Popp, Thomas, (Co-Investigator (CoI))
  • Tillich, Stefan, (Co-Investigator (CoI))
  • Aigner, Manfred Josef, (Principal Investigator (PI))

Project: Research project

Description

The threat of side-channel attacks is of crucial importance when designing systems with cryptographic hardware or software. Especially smart cards and related micro-chip systems have shown considerable vulnerabilities in this respect. Side-channel attacks analyze and exploit the information produced by some system by, for example, measuring its power consumption or the electro-magnetic emanation of this system. From these traces the attacker can potentially make conclusions about the secret data involved in a computation inside the system. Meanwhile, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), and their related attacks, simple and differential electro-magnetic emanation analysis (SEMA, DEMA), became known to a broader public, and thus pose the biggest threat. In the following, we will refer to these side-channel analysis methods and related attacks by using the acronym SCA. In SCARD, we propose to enhance the typical micro-chip design flow – from high level system description over register transfer layer description down to gate level net lists, and finally placement & routing of the micro-chip – in order to provide a means for designing side-channel resistant circuits and systems. Moreover, we intend to study the whole phenomenon of SCA in a consistent manner, and will also provide appropriate analysis tools and design tools for the designer of secure systems. We consider these additional ingredients of the traditional design flow of micro-chips as necess
StatusFinished
Effective start/end date1/01/0431/05/06