On the Applicability of Time-Driven Cache Attacks on Mobile Devices

Raphael Spreitzer, Thomas Plos

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandBeitrag in einem Konferenzband

Abstract

Cache attacks are known to be sophisticated attacks against cryptographic implementations on desktop computers. Recently, investigations of such attacks on specific testbeds with processors that are employed in mobile devices have been done. In this work we investigate the applicability of Bernstein's timing attack and the cache-collision attack by Bogdanov et al. in real environments on three state-of-the-art mobile devices: an Acer Iconia A510, a Google Nexus S, and a Samsung Galaxy SIII. We show that T-table based implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) leak enough timing information on these devices in order to recover parts of the used secret key using Bernstein's timing attack. We also show that systems with a cache-line size larger than 32 bytes exacerbate the cache-collision attack of Bogdanov et al.
Originalspracheenglisch
TitelNetwork and System Security - NSS 2013, 7th International Conference, Madrid, Spain, June 3-4, 2013, Proceedings
Herausgeber (Verlag)Springer
Seiten656-662
Band7873
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2013
VeranstaltungInternational Conference on Network and System Security - Madrid, Spanien
Dauer: 3 Jun 20134 Jun 2013

Publikationsreihe

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Herausgeber (Verlag)Springer

Konferenz

KonferenzInternational Conference on Network and System Security
LandSpanien
OrtMadrid
Zeitraum3/06/134/06/13

Fields of Expertise

  • Information, Communication & Computing

Treatment code (Nähere Zuordnung)

  • Application

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