Nethammer: Inducing Rowhammer Faults through Network Requests

Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Lukas Raab, Lukas Lamster, Misiker Tadesse Aga, Clementine Maurice, Daniel Gruß

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandBeitrag in einem KonferenzbandForschungBegutachtung

Abstract

In this paper, we present Nethammer, a remote Rowhammer attack without a single attacker-controlled line of code on the targeted system, i.e., not even JavaScript. Nethammer works on commodity consumer-grade systems that either are protected with quality-of-service techniques like Intel CAT or that use uncached memory, flush instructions, or non-temporal instructions while handling network requests (e.g., for interaction with the network device). We demonstrate that the frequency of the cache misses is in all three cases high enough to induce bit flips. Our evaluation showed that depending on the location, the bit flip compromises either the security and integrity of the system and the data of its users, or it can leave persistent damage on the system, i.e., persistent denial of service. We invalidate threat models of Rowhammer defenses building upon the assumption of a local attacker. Consequently, we show that most state-of-the-art defenses have no effect on our attack. In particular, we demonstrate that target-row-refresh (TRR) implemented in DDR4 has no aggravating effect on local or remote Rowhammer attacks.
Originalspracheenglisch
TitelSILM 2020 Workshop
PublikationsstatusEingereicht - 19 Jun 2020
Veranstaltung2nd Workshop on the Security of Software/Hardware Interfaces - Genova, Italien
Dauer: 7 Sep 202011 Sep 2020

Konferenz

Konferenz2nd Workshop on the Security of Software/Hardware Interfaces
KurztitelSILM 2020
LandItalien
OrtGenova
Zeitraum7/09/2011/09/20

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    Lipp, M., Schwarz, M., Raab, L., Lamster, L., Aga, M. T., Maurice, C., & Gruß, D. (2020). Nethammer: Inducing Rowhammer Faults through Network Requests. Manuskript zur Veröffentlichung eingereicht. in SILM 2020 Workshop