How trusted execution environments fuel research on microarchitectural attacks

Michael Schwarz; Daniel Gruss

doi:10.1109/MSEC.2020.2993896

How trusted execution environments fuel research on microarchitectural attacks

Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss

Institut für Angewandte Informationsverarbeitung und Kommunikationstechnologie (7050)

Publikation: Beitrag in einer Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Begutachtung

Abstract

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) enabled research in scenarios where highest-privileged attackers had precise control over systems and microarchitecture. Insights gained from such attacks facilitated the discovery of non-TEE attacks, such as Spectre (as well as Foreshadow from within virtual machines).

Originalsprache	englisch
Aufsatznummer	9107096
Seiten (von - bis)	18-27
Seitenumfang	10
Fachzeitschrift	IEEE Security & Privacy
Jahrgang	18
Ausgabenummer	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/MSEC.2020.2993896
Publikationsstatus	Veröffentlicht - 1 Sept. 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computernetzwerke und -kommunikation
Elektrotechnik und Elektronik
Recht

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10.1109/MSEC.2020.2993896

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Leakage-Free - Hardware-Software Informationsflussanalyse für Leckagefreie Code-Generierung
Gruss, D.
1/10/18 → 30/09/20
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How trusted execution environments fuel research on microarchitectural attacks

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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