Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandBeitrag in einem KonferenzbandForschungBegutachtung

Abstract

FlexAEAD is one of the round-1 candidates in the ongoing NIST Lightweight Cryptography standardization project. In this note, we show several forgery attacks on FlexAEAD with complexity less than the security bound given by the designers, such as a block reordering attack on full FlexAEAD-128 with estimated success probability about 2^54. Additionally, we show some trivial forgeries and point out domain separation issues.
Originalspracheenglisch
TitelIMA Cryptography and Coding - IMACC 2019
Seitenumfang12
PublikationsstatusAngenommen/In Druck - 5 Sep 2019
VeranstaltungIMACC 2019: 17th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding - Oxford, Großbritannien / Vereinigtes Königreich
Dauer: 16 Dez 201918 Dez 2019

Konferenz

KonferenzIMACC 2019
LandGroßbritannien / Vereinigtes Königreich
OrtOxford
Zeitraum16/12/1918/12/19

Fingerprint

Standardization
Cryptography

Schlagwörter

    Dies zitieren

    Eichlseder, M., Kales, D., & Schofnegger, M. (Angenommen/Im Druck). Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD. in IMA Cryptography and Coding - IMACC 2019

    Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD. / Eichlseder, Maria; Kales, Daniel; Schofnegger, Markus.

    IMA Cryptography and Coding - IMACC 2019. 2019.

    Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandBeitrag in einem KonferenzbandForschungBegutachtung

    Eichlseder, M, Kales, D & Schofnegger, M 2019, Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD. in IMA Cryptography and Coding - IMACC 2019., Oxford, Großbritannien / Vereinigtes Königreich, 16/12/19.
    Eichlseder M, Kales D, Schofnegger M. Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD. in IMA Cryptography and Coding - IMACC 2019. 2019
    @inproceedings{a9745b49147d412492f1edf408571495,
    title = "Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD",
    abstract = "FlexAEAD is one of the round-1 candidates in the ongoing NIST Lightweight Cryptography standardization project. In this note, we show several forgery attacks on FlexAEAD with complexity less than the security bound given by the designers, such as a block reordering attack on full FlexAEAD-128 with estimated success probability about 2^54. Additionally, we show some trivial forgeries and point out domain separation issues.",
    keywords = "authenticated encryption, forgery attack, NIST LWC",
    author = "Maria Eichlseder and Daniel Kales and Markus Schofnegger",
    year = "2019",
    month = "9",
    day = "5",
    language = "English",
    booktitle = "IMA Cryptography and Coding - IMACC 2019",

    }

    TY - GEN

    T1 - Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD

    AU - Eichlseder, Maria

    AU - Kales, Daniel

    AU - Schofnegger, Markus

    PY - 2019/9/5

    Y1 - 2019/9/5

    N2 - FlexAEAD is one of the round-1 candidates in the ongoing NIST Lightweight Cryptography standardization project. In this note, we show several forgery attacks on FlexAEAD with complexity less than the security bound given by the designers, such as a block reordering attack on full FlexAEAD-128 with estimated success probability about 2^54. Additionally, we show some trivial forgeries and point out domain separation issues.

    AB - FlexAEAD is one of the round-1 candidates in the ongoing NIST Lightweight Cryptography standardization project. In this note, we show several forgery attacks on FlexAEAD with complexity less than the security bound given by the designers, such as a block reordering attack on full FlexAEAD-128 with estimated success probability about 2^54. Additionally, we show some trivial forgeries and point out domain separation issues.

    KW - authenticated encryption

    KW - forgery attack

    KW - NIST LWC

    M3 - Conference contribution

    BT - IMA Cryptography and Coding - IMACC 2019

    ER -