Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption

Thomas Unterluggauer, Stefan Mangard

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandBeitrag in einem KonferenzbandForschungBegutachtung

Abstract

Memory and disk encryption is a common measure to protect sensitive information in memory from adversaries with physical access. However, physical access also comes with the risk of physical attacks. As these may pose a threat to memory confidentiality, this paper investigates contemporary memory and disk encryption schemes and their implementations with respect to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). It shows that DPA and DFA recover the keys of all the investigated schemes, including the tweakable block ciphers XEX and XTS. This paper also verifies the feasibility of such attacks in practice. Using the EM side channel, a DPA on the disk encryption employed
within the ext4 file system is shown to reveal the used master key on a Zynq Z-7010 system on chip. The results suggest that memory and disk encryption secure against physical attackers is at least four times more expensive.
Originalspracheenglisch
TitelConstructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016
Herausgeber (Verlag)Springer International Publishing AG
Seiten3-18
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2016
VeranstaltungInternational Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - Graz, Österreich
Dauer: 14 Apr 201615 Apr 2016

Publikationsreihe

NameLNCS
Band9689

Konferenz

KonferenzInternational Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
LandÖsterreich
OrtGraz
Zeitraum14/04/1615/04/16

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Schlagwörter

    Fields of Expertise

    • Information, Communication & Computing

    Dieses zitieren

    Unterluggauer, T., & Mangard, S. (2016). Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption. in Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016 (S. 3-18). (LNCS; Band 9689). Springer International Publishing AG . https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_1