Evolution of Defenses against Transient-Execution Attacks

Claudio Alberto Canella, Sai Manoj Pudukotai Dinakarrao, Daniel Gruß, Khaled N. Khasawneh

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandBeitrag in einem Konferenzband

Abstract

Transient-execution attacks, such as Meltdown and Spectre, exploit performance optimizations in modern CPUs to enable unauthorized access to data across protection boundaries. Against these attacks, we have noticed a rapid growth of deployed and proposed countermeasures. In this paper, we show the evolution of countermeasures
against transient-execution attacks by both industry and academia since the initial discoveries of the attacks. We show that despite the advances in the understanding and systematic view of the field, the proposed and deployed defenses are limited.
Originalspracheenglisch
TitelGLSVLSI 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI
Herausgeber (Verlag)ACM/IEEE
Seiten169-174
Seitenumfang6
ISBN (elektronisch)9781450379441
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 7 Sep 2020
VeranstaltungGLSVLSI 2020: 30th ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI - Virtuell, China
Dauer: 8 Sep 202011 Sep 2020

Publikationsreihe

NameProceedings of the ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, GLSVLSI

Konferenz

KonferenzGLSVLSI 2020
LandChina
OrtVirtuell
Zeitraum8/09/2011/09/20

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • !!Engineering(all)

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