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Abstract
Algebraically simple PRFs, ciphers, or cryptographic hash functions are becoming increasingly popular, for example due to their attractive properties for MPC and new proof systems (SNARKs, STARKs, among many others). In this paper, we focus on the algebraically simple construction MiMC, which became an attractive cryptanalytic target due to its simplicity, but also due to its use as a baseline in a competition for more recent algorithms exploring this design space. For the first time, we are able to describe key-recovery attacks on all full-round versions of MiMC over F2n, requiring half the code book. In the chosen-ciphertext scenario, recovering the key from this data for the n-bit full version of MiMC takes the equivalent of less than 2n-log2(n)+1 calls to MiMC and negligible amounts of memory. The attack procedure is a generalization of higher-order differential cryptanalysis, and it is based on two main ingredients. First, we present a higher-order distinguisher which exploits the fact that the algebraic degree of MiMC grows significantly slower than originally believed. Secondly, we describe an approach to turn this distinguisher into a key-recovery attack without guessing the full subkey. Finally, we show that approximately ⌈ log 3(2 · R) ⌉ more rounds (where R= ⌈ n· log 3(2 ) ⌉ is the current number of rounds of MiMC-n/n) can be necessary and sufficient to restore the security against the key-recovery attack presented here. The attack has been practically verified on toy versions of MiMC. Note that our attack does not affect the security of MiMC over prime fields.
Originalsprache | englisch |
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Titel | Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2020 - 26th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, 2020, Proceedings |
Untertitel | 26th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Daejeon, South Korea, December 7–11, 2020, Proceedings, Part |
Redakteure/-innen | Shiho Moriai, Huaxiong Wang |
Erscheinungsort | Cham |
Herausgeber (Verlag) | Springer |
Seiten | 477-506 |
Seitenumfang | 30 |
Band | 1 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-3-030-64836-7 |
DOIs | |
Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 1 Jan. 2020 |
Veranstaltung | ASIACRYPT 2020 : International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security - Virtuell, Südkorea Dauer: 7 Dez. 2020 → 11 Dez. 2020 |
Publikationsreihe
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Band | 12491 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (elektronisch) | 1611-3349 |
Konferenz
Konferenz | ASIACRYPT 2020 |
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Land/Gebiet | Südkorea |
Ort | Virtuell |
Zeitraum | 7/12/20 → 11/12/20 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Theoretische Informatik
- Allgemeine Computerwissenschaft
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